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STATE COURT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL
REGULATION:
Thomas v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources
Gary L. Cole*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 1993, in Anderson v. North Carolina Department
of Human Resources' ("Anderson"), the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina invalidated a federal regulation by holding that a United States
Department of Agriculture ("USDA") regulation impermissibly
conflicted with a federal statute, the Food Stamp Act regarding the date
of commencement of disqualification of a recipient found to be
ineligible by reason of fraud.2 The court held that the federal USDA
regulation conflicted with the Food Stamp Act which stated that the
disqualification period was to take effect immediately upon a
determination of ineligibility and was to last for one year The USDA
regulation stated, in contrast that if "the individual is not eligible for
the Program at the time the disqualification period is to begin, the
period is to be postponed until the individual applies for and is
determined eligible for the benefits."4
The North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that Anderson's
*Third year law student, Loyola University Chicago, School of Law.
'428 S.E.2d 267 (1993).
2Id.
'he relevant section of the Food Stamp Act reads as follows:
(b) Fraud and misrepresentation; disqualification penalties; ineligibility period;
application procedure
(1) Any person who has been found by any State of Federal court or
administrative agency to have intentionally (A) made a false or misleading statement, or
misrepresented, concealed or withheld facts, or (B) committed any act that constitutes a
violation of this chapter, the regulations issued thereunder, or any State statute, for the
purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, or possessing coupons or
authorization cards shall, immediately upon the rendering of such determination, become
ineligible for further participation in the program-
(I) for a period of I year upon the first occasion of any such determination.
7 U.S.C.A. §2015(b)(1) (1997).
47 C.F.R. 273.16(e)(8)(iii) (1992).
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disqualification period began on the date that she was first found to be
in violation of the Food Stamp Act.5 The North Carolina Department
of Human Resources ("NCDHR"), the state agency responsible for
certifying food stamp recipients, thereafter applied the appellate court's
holding in Anderson only to plaintiff Edith Anderson.6 Anderson and
other plaintiffs similarly situated filed a class action complaint in
Guilford County Superior Court on January 7, 1994, seeking NCDHR's
compliance with the appellate court's holding in Anderson.7 The trial
court refused to certify the class and dismissed the plaintiffs
complaints.'
Anderson appealed and in Thomas v. North Carolina
Department of Human Resources ("Thomas"), revisited the issue.' By
this time the NCDHR had voluntarily revised its regulations to comport
with the revised federal USDA regulations which were now consistent
with the Anderson holding. The NCDHR argued that the issue at
controversy was now moot and sought dismissal. I" The plaintiffs,
however, argued that absent a court ruling directly on the issue, the
NCDHR would revert to its conduct prior to the Anderson decision"
Since significant concerns regarding NCDHR's initial refusal to apply
the appellate court's ruling to the plaintiff and all persons similarly
situated persisted, the North Carolina Court of Appeals declined to
dismiss the suit and addressed the issues directly.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August of 1989, the Guilford County Department of Social
Services ("DSS") found Edith Anderson guilty of failing to report a
member of her household's personal income on her February 1989
application for food stamps. 2 In January 1991, after waiting more than
'Anderson at 269.
'rhomas v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources, 478 S.E. 2d 816,
818(1996).71d
81d.
91d.
10Id. at 820.
"Id. at 818.21d at 817.
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one year, Anderson reapplied to the DSS for food stamps. 3 The DSS
notified Anderson that pursuant to state and federal regulations 4 she
was ineligible for food stamps because her one year period of
disqualification would not commence until she had reapplied for the
benefits and then was found to be eligible.' 5 After exhausting possible
administrative remedies with the DSS, Anderson filed suit in the
Guilford County Superior Court.'6 The suit alleged that the NCDHR
had delayed her disqualification period in violation of the federal Food
Stamp Act. 7 The Food Stamp Act required that disqualification
periods by reason of fraud begin immediately upon a finding of fraud.' 8
The NCDHR was required to notify the USDA upon notice of suit so
that they might remove the case to federal court to adequately protect
the interests of the government. 9 The NCDHR failed to notify the
USDA, however, and therefore became ineligible for any federal
contributions for amounts awarded in State court actions.2"
Both plaintiff Anderson and the NCDHR moved for summary
judgement and in January 1992 the Superior Court allowed NCDHR's
motion and denied Anderson's.2 ' The North Carolina Court of Appeals
on appeal reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
USDA regulation and its corresponding state regulation allowing delay
of the plaintiffs disqualification period were in conflict with the
congressional intent of the Food Stamp Act which required that the
disqualification period commence immediately upon a finding of
ineligibility for fraud.2"
The NCDHR did not at that time further appeal the court of
appeals' decision but instead applied the court's holding only to the
plaintiff Anderson and not to all other food stamp recipients found
ineligible for fraud.23
13Id
6Thomas, 478 S.E.2d 816, 817.
171d.
"87 U.S.C.A. s 2015(b)(1) (1997).
9Thomas, 478 S.E.2d 816, 817.
2OlM
2Id at 817.
"Id. at 818.
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Anderson then filed an administrative petition with the NCDHR
requesting that it adopt the Court of Appeals holding to all other
persons similarly situated.24  NCDHR denied this petition and
Anderson subsequently filed a class action suit in January 1994 in the
Superior Court, Guilford County, seeking judicial review of the
administrative denial of the petition and an injunction compelling
NCDHR to comply with the court of appeals decision.25
The Secretary of Agriculture filed a motion to intervene in
March 1994 which was granted in April 1994.26 In April 1994, at the
defendant Secretary's request, the case was removed to federal district
court.27 Defendant Sherry D. Thomas replaced Edith Anderson as the
named defendant." In May 1995, however, the federal court remanded
the suit to the Superior Court, Guilford County, after deciding the state
court had jurisdiction and should enforce its own court orders.29 In
September 1995, the defendant Secretary of Agriculture moved for
summary judgement and the NCDHR moved to dismiss the suit?0 The
Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgement and the
dismissed the case in October 1995. 3" Plaintiff Thomas appealed to the
Court of Appeals of North Carolina.32
IH. THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Thomas considered
three issues: (1) the doctrine of mootness in state court33; (2) the issue
of separation of powers between state courts and legislature34; (3) the
state court of appeals' ability to invalidate a federal regulation."
14Id
231d.
271d.
28 Id
29 d.
311d
321d
33Id at 820.
34Id at 821.3 1d at 823.
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A. The Mootness Doctrine in State Court
Defendant NCDHR contended that the case became moot when
both it and USDA voluntarily revised their regulations following the
Anderson decision.36 NCDHR contended that since it had voluntarily
ceased refusing to apply the court's ruling in Anderson, the issues of its
prior conduct and therefore the case at bar were rendered moot.
7
Plaintiff Thomas, however, contended that the court should review the
case under an exception to the mootness doctrine."
The court of appeals agreed with Thomas, noting that while
both North Carolina state courts and federal courts had avoided
addressing moot issues, significant exceptions applied when issues of
"public interest" 9 and those "capable of repetition, yet evading
review," were presented.' The court further noted that although the
doctrine of mootness had different judicial foundations in state courts
and federal courts, the limits of the doctrine were expressed in a similar
fashion in both courts.4"
The court laid the framework for its exceptions reasoning by
citing the City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.,'2 in which the U.S.
Supreme Court held that "a defendant's voluntary cessation of a
challenged practice does not deprive a court of its power to determine
the legality of practice." '43 The court then cited In re Jackson's"
holding that courts may review moot issues when the cases are "capable
of repetition, yet evading review,"45 and Matthews v. Department of
Transportation,' when the "question involved is a matter of public
interest. ' 47
361d. at 820.
3"id
381d
391d. at 821.
401d. at 820.
41Jd
42455 U.S. 283 (1982).
431d. at 289.
-352 S.E.2d 449 (1987).
45Id. at 452.
-242 S.E.2d 653 (1978).
471d. at 654.
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The Court of Appeals also applied Quern v. Mandley8 which
"provides for review of cases where a defendant voluntarily ceases its
illegal conduct during the pendency of the appeal." 49 The court
reasoned that ifNCDHR's voluntary cessation of its challenged practice
led to the abandonment ofjudicial review in this case, there would be
no restraint on the NCDHR from renewing its activities and then
ceasing them again just time to avoid judicial review5 This cycle
could continue indefinitely so long as no court ruled directly on the
issue. The Court therefore declined to dismiss the case as moot.5'
B. Separation of Powers
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina viewed the actions of
the NCDHR in disregarding the Court's directives in Anderson as a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine of the North Carolina
Constitution." Article I, section 6 of the North Carolina Constitution
provides that "the legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of
the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each
other."53
The court discussed the role of the separation of powers
doctrine, reasoning that the ultimate purpose of the doctrine is to
provide a system of checks and balances among the branches of state
governments to prevent "the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other."' In this way, the court concluded,
"each branch, in its own way, is the people's agent, its fiduciary for
certain purposes.""
When NCDHR interpreted the USDA regulation and therefore
the congressional intent of the Food Stamp Act and refused to apply the
North Carolina Court of Appeals holding in Anderson to a class of
similarly situated plaintiffs, it violated the separation of powers doctrine
48436 U.S. 725 (1978).
'
9Thomas, 478 S.E.2d 816, 821.
sold.
31Id.
52Id.
S3Id
Id. at 822.53d.
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by "attempting to arrogate to itself the distinct duties of the judiciary in
having the final word in interpreting statutes."56 NCDHR was bound
to follow the directives of the state court and refusal to do so was in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine of the North Carolina
constitution. The proper course of action for a state administrative
agency contesting the decision of a state court with authority and
jurisdiction over its action is to seek reversal through the courts of that
state. The court of appeals held that the agency has "no right or
authority to disregard such decisions.""
When a state court decides that a statute enacted by the
legislature of that state is unconstitutional, the effect of that court's
holding is to "void the statute entirely as if it no longer existed.""8
Once it has been declared unconstitutional, no agency of the state may
act in furtherance of the provisions of the statute.59 The court of
appeals held that the same analysis applied to its decisions regarding
the provision of a federal administrative regulation and NCDHR's
corresponding regulation.' Since it was the court's purview to
determine whether the language of the federal regulation and the
subsequent action of the NCDHR conflicted with the language of the
federal enabling legislation, action taken by the NCDHR in furtherance
of the invalidated regulation constituted a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine.6" The court concluded that "no action whatsoever by
the administrative agency can breathe life into the invalidated
regulation absent reversal of a modification of this court's order by a
higher court or absent legislative action sufficiently altering the
enabling act."62
16ld.
"Id. at 823.
5S1d.
3 9Md
601d.
611d,621d
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C. The State Court ofAppeals Invalidation of
the Federal USDA Regulation
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina next addressed
NCDHR's allegation that court had authority over its actions inferior
to that of the Secretary of Agriculture's regulations. NCDHR
contended that the federal regulations empowered it to ignore the court
of appeals' decision in Anderson.63 The court interpreted NCDHR's
argument as containing two separate issues: (1) whether the state court
of appeals had the authority to interpret the Food Stamp Act as a matter
of federalism; (2) whether the state court of appeals must give
deference to the interpretation of the Food Stamp Act by a federal
administrative agency or whether the court is free to interpret the
federal statute on its own within its jurisdictional boundaries."
Regarding the issue of federalism, the court distinguished the
issue as a matter of "division of powers" rather than as a matter of
"separation of powers. 6 5 The court noted that under the federal
system, the states and the Federal Government have concurrent
sovereignty and are limited only by the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. Absent congressional intent to the contrary,
state courts have "inherent authority.., to adjudicate claims arising
under the laws of the United States ... if exclusive jurisdiction is
neither express or implied . . . . " Since there was no evidence of
congressional removal of that jurisdiction, the court concluded that it
was free to invalidate the USDA regulation within its jurisdictional
boundaries.67
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that it was not
required to give judicial deference to the USDA's interpretation the
Food Stamp Act.68 The court's holding in Anderson served to
invalidate both the federal regulation and its corresponding state
regulation by holding them to be impermissibly in conflict with the
63Id.
"Id.65Id.
6Id. at 824.
67
Id
"Id.
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"clear and unambiguous" language of the Food Stamp Act. While the
court acknowledged that in some cases it would be obliged to give
deference to the federal agency's interpretation of the statute, it
concluded that deference is not applicable where the federal regulation
and its state counterpart "alters the clearly expressed intent of
Congress." The court therefore hinged its argument in invalidating the
federal regulation on the conflict between the USDA's interpretation of
the relevant provisions of the Food Stamp Act and the "clearly
expressed" intentions of the U.S. Congress.69
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals
invalidating a federal regulation is a significant precedent of a state
court interpreting conflicts between federal statutes and federal
regulations when those regulations are adopted by state regulatory
agencies and are subject to judicial review by state courts. Whenever
ambiguity exists between a federal statute and federal enabling
legislation, state courts would be free to provide clarity to that
ambiguity by interpreting the federal statute. The North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that since dual sovereignty exists between states
and federal governments, and unless exclusive jurisdiction is either
expressed or implied, a state court is free to rule on matters within its
jurisdiction.7 ° As no divestment of that jurisdiction was evident, the
court's ruling in Anderson was proper.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals also declined to dismiss
the suit in Thomas as moot when the NCDHR voluntarily began
applying the court's holding in Anderson. ' The court reasoned that as
long as the case was "capable of repetition, yet evading review," even
though there was a "voluntary cessation of a challenged practice," there
was potential for future renewal of such activities by the state agency.'
Moreover, state court decisions on mootness doctrine need not
691d
71ld. At 820.
7idM
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be identical to the federal mootness doctrine. In a recent case,
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, the United States Supreme
Court held that once the plaintiff, a state employee, left the employment
of the defendant, the State of Arizona, the case became moot and
vacated the judgement of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals." The
Supreme Court applied the constitutional jurisdictional underpinning
of Article III of the United States Constitution to render the controversy
moot.74 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina, however, considered
the issue of mootness to be one of "judicial restraint" and was free to
decide whether to review the case when questions regarding the
NCDHR's future conduct were at issue.75 Moreover, since Article III
does not apply to state courts, they are not bound to apply the mootness
doctrine in a fashion identical to that of The United States Supreme
Court's application of Article III.
73117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997).
141d. at 1058.
SThomas 478 S.E. 2d at 820.
